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Abstract— Substations are the junctions of any transmission and 
distribution network in utilities. They carry bulk power to the 
customers using transmission network involving high voltage (HV) 
apparatus. Protection of HV equipment during a fault is the primary 
concern of an operator. Advancement in design and manufacturing 
of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and IEC 61850 are finding 
increased application in utilities from automation and 
communication perspective, which addresses few shortcomings that 
couldn't be resolved in a conventional system. However there are few 
challenges in the digital scheme such as end to end delays in the 
packet transfer and interoperability of devices. Utilities are able to 
perceive these benefits by leveraging on IEC 62439-3 which has two 
important topologies i.e. Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and 
High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR). It offers seamless 
redundancy in digital protection network without compromising the 
availability and downtime cost. In this paper, an Optimized Network 
Engineering Tool (OPNET) is used to simulate and compare the 
performance of these topologies with respect to delay time.  
 
Index Terms— Ethernet, IEC 61850, IEC 62439-3, PRP and HSR. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
odern substations are expected to work in a reliable and 
efficient environment providing adequate redundancy in 
protection to the substation assets and transmission lines 
interconnecting these high voltage (HV) substations. Lack of 
redundancy in protection scheme in an event of a fault, could 
cause costly downtime, high starting costs and loss of valuable 
data. This could have enormous impact on the operator 
technically and financially.  
Ethernets are increasingly shaping up the automation 
requirement and proving to be a dependable protection scheme 
from an automation and control perspective. Substation 
Automation System (SAS) which works at three layers i.e., 1) 
Station, 2) Bay, and 3) Process layers, brings digital technology 
to the fore front of a smart grid substation. However, strict 
performance monitoring and validation of the results are few 
key prerequisites prior to its implementation in mass which 
does not seem to be enjoying the confidence of the utility 
operators. Although, IEC 61850 lays down certain guidelines 
for communication protocol at station, bay and process level 
components, yet issues related to redundancy offered in the 
protection scheme seems to have gaps, as frames are lost at 
nodes and switches [1]. Furthermore, the timing requirement of 
a protection scheme to operate during a fault being very critical, 
such as interlocking and blocking, the scheme must act quickly 
operate within 4-ms as per the IEC 61850-5 standard which has 
been exhibited in Table-I. In such challenging circumstances, 
the redundant structure within a topology play a vital role. This 
is achieved by having a redundancies in the system i.e., the 
entire network is duplicated including the communication 
channel while in media redundancy, system and devices are 
individually duplicated.  
 
Table-I: Communication recovery time based on IEC 61850-5 
Ed. 2 [2].  
 
Communication 
Partners 
Application 
Recovery time  
 (in ms) 
Communication 
Recovery Time 
 (in ms) 
Client - Server  
SC to IED   
800 400 
NTP , SNMP 500 300 
IED to IED, 
reverse 
blocking, 
interlocking  
12 4 
Trip GOOSE 8 4 
Bus Bar 
Protection 
< 1 seamless 
Sampled 
Values 
< 2 0 
 
In a recent development, IEC TC57 working group in 2010 
have used IEC 62439-3 Ed. 1 and 2 standards to address the 
redundancy issues in digital protection of a SAS network. 
Leveraging on IEC 62439-3 standard, PRP and HSR topologies 
provide seamless recovery in case of a single link failure. IEC 
62439-3, Edition 2 published in 2012 has undertaken few 
changes with respect to:- 
• Tagging of PRP frames  
• Clarification on interoperability 
• Consideration of clock synchronization 
• Simplifying the testing and commissioning procedure. 
It may be noted, in a PRP topology, Doubly Attached Node 
(DAN) enabled equipment are connected as shown in Fig. 1 
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with frames circulated in two parallel networks. This is layer 2 
redundancy with equipment connected in a cross structured 
linked engineering environment. It fully supports GOOSE and 
Sampled Values (SV) traffic in a process bus structure.  
 
 
Fig. 1: PRP Network in a digital protection scheme [1].  
 
Fig. 2 shows a typical HSR network in a ring topology 
wherein IEDs are connected in DAN with two independent 
paths for frame circulation. In this topology the source sends 
two frames in two opposite direction ensuring at least one frame 
reach its destination.  
 
 
Fig. 2: HSR Topology in a digital protection scheme [1]. 
 
In both PRP and HSR topologies, Link Redundancy Entity 
(LRE) which buffers between ports and upper layer, manages 
the frame traffic transition. Substation IEDs with a Single 
Attached Node (SAN) which needs to have PRP and HSR 
features that must be connected via Red Box has been exhibited 
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2[1]. By introducing Red boxes in PRP/HSR 
topologies, standard SAN IED devices can be converted to 
DAN devices and redundancy in the digital network could be 
achieved. In this scheme, one host port is connected to the 
standard digital protection device while two other ports are 
meant for redundancies. 
As per IEC 62439-3 guideline, SAS scheme must regularly 
monitor and check the frames at an interval per minute scanning 
the entire network for SV and GOOSE packets checking for the 
loss of the missing frames. IEC 62439-3 not only checks for 
redundancies in the network, but also at the nodes and other 
compliant devices connected in the topology. Although the 
initial capital cost of PRP topology in a digital protection 
scheme is higher than an equivalent conventional one due to the 
duplication of protection infrastructure, yet it offers reliability 
and redundancy which could negate other disadvantages. 
Further, manufacturers are working towards upgrading Rapid 
Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP) devices interfacing with Red 
boxes which makes it fully compliant to IEC 62439-3 standard. 
However, there are very few utilities around the world which 
are operational using PRP/HSR digital protection topologies.  
The PRP and HSR network have few differences such as; 
PRP manages two independent networks in duplicates, while 
HSR achieves it on a single ring network. PRP attaches a trailer 
at the end of each frame known as Redundancy Control Trailer 
(RCT) while HSR in the network attaches a HSR tag. In Fig. 2 
is shown a PRP frame with redundancy control. IEC 62439-3 
Ed. 1 defines RCT for 4 bytes tag while Ed. 2 extends it to 6 
bytes. Ed.1 defines methods of supervision of frames while Ed. 
2 lays down new guide lines to manage HSR. All HSR traffic 
gets recognized based on Ed. 2. The other notable difference in 
first and second edition of IEC 62439-3 is based on frame 
length. Ed. 1 had a restriction of 4 bytes for PRP but that 
restriction was lifted in Ed.2. Both PRP and HSR now have now 
6 bytes in Ed. 2. Other conspicuous difference between Ed. 1 
and Ed. 2 are based on sequence numbering of circulating 
frames, method of handling duplicate frames and node tables, 
clock synchronization [2].  
 
 
Fig. 3: PRP with RCT frame [2]. 
 
Figs. 3 and 4 show typical PRP and HSR tags respectively in 
the frames just before the addresses. 
 
Fig. 4: HSR Frame with the tag at the front [2]. 
 
The disadvantage of HSR topology on the other hand is, it 
could accept undesirable circulating frames. The HSR network 
sends signals in two different directions within the ring. Each 
message in the loop carries a sequence number, which is 
accepted or rejected at the node depending on signal packets it 
carries [3]. Hence, HSR scheme has advantage of not only being 
a simple in structure with less hardware, but also accommodates 
higher traffic within the link that could lead to data clogging. 
This shortcoming is negated by applying bi-directional data 
communication channels which means, in case of a link failure, 
there are no stoppages to the data transfer circulating in 
healthier loop.  
In this paper, a software based simulation is implemented in 
a laboratory environment using an Optimized Network 
Engineering Tool (OPNET) manufactured by Riverbed 
modeler offering simulations. The simulation result exhibits 
delay encountered and traffic load of data packets reaching out 
to various nodes in bits/sec based on these two seamless 
topologies. The frame stacks that carry Generic Object Oriented 
Substation Events (GOOSE) delivers real time and mission 
critical messages to the IEDs that exhibit latency and delay in 
  
 
the overall network. Hence, it is important to reduce the 
network traffic and bandwidth [4].  
Summarizing the benefits of PRP and HSR topologies [5- 
7]:- 
• Seamless protocol could be achieved using these 
topologies 
• Availability of the SAS function through zero recovery 
time from a single link failure  
• No time delay in the event of a fault due to transmission 
of frames in duplicates 
• Easy coupling between PRP and HSR network to have 
best of both the features i.e. Combination of PRP and 
HSR, making the protection scheme robust, reliable and 
economical 
• Tolerates any single network component failure  
• Allows nodes not equipped for redundancy to operate by 
introducing Red boxes in the network 
• Supports time synchronization 
• Reduction in interoperability issue of different 
manufacturer products. 
 
This paper is divided into 5 sections. Section I is for 
introduction which provides the background of the digital 
protection explaining the operation of PRP and HSR topologies, 
Section II deals with the node structures of PRP and HSR 
topologies. Section III provides the details of topologies in a 
substation environment, and IV details with the OPNET 
simulation results and discussion. Finally, the conclusion is 
presented in section V.  
 
II.  NODE STRUCTURES IN PRP AND HSR TOPOLOGIES 
A) PRP Node Structure 
In a PRP node structure shown in Fig. 5, DANP has two 
Ethernet adapters but one Medium Access Control (MAC) and 
Internet Protocol (IP) address. Resilience is achieved by 
sending frames in two different directions in the ring. It 
provides seamless or bump-less redundancies which in other 
words, data is made available with zero delay during a link 
failure. In the event of a fault, any interruption which could 
prevent a frame from arriving at the node, shall cause other 
healthy frames to seek an alternative route, fulfilling the 
requirement of redundancy in the protection scheme. In this 
study, a station bus configuration has been considered to keep 
the structure simple. The timing requirement of station bus and 
process bus topologies are distinct, which underlines the 
protection redundancy requirement. In a station bus, delay up 
to a magnitude of 100-ms are tolerable for interlocking and trip, 
but for a reverse blocking, only 4-ms tolerance is acceptable as 
enumerated in IEC 61850-5 and exhibited in communication 
recovery time in Table-I.  
In Fig. 5, a cross linked duplicate PRP network is shown in 
the form of a block diagram. It has two layers of redundancies 
with MAC and IP address present in each of the adapters. 
Furthermore, Link Redundancy Entity (LRE) act as a buffer 
between upper layer and ports. In a source node, LRE duplicates 
the frames, while at the destination node it monitors the packet 
flow in the duplicate loop. If a link or port is damaged, LRE 
shall continue to receive copies of the frames through an 
alternative path, while discarding the error frames. 
Additionally, in LRE, modification is achieved by the software 
and processor.  
 
 
Fig. 5: Node structure of PRP [6].  
  
B) High Availability HSR Node Structure  
In a HSR topology, IEDs are daisy chained in a ring. Frames 
are sent in opposite directions at the same time in a loop.  
During a fault, error frames are discarded while healthier 
frames arrive at the destination node with zero recovery time, 
similar to the PRP topology choosing an alternative route. This 
ensures no down time in the network. As an example, when the 
unicast frames are sent in a loop, the frames broadcast messages 
to every node in the loop, with significant chances of getting 
acceptance at least by one IED. IEC 62439-3 stipulates in the 
event of a reduced traffic in the network, each node shall 
forward the frames within 5µs. In other words, with duplicated 
frame messages travelling in opposite directions in the loop, 
frame messages are never lost. This feature in HSR topology 
enables frames are never lost and scheme offers total protection 
with zero-fault recovery time, in the event of a node or link 
failure. It restores SAS network to a healthy condition faster 
than a conventional system from clearing fault in a protection 
scheme perspective. However, the major disadvantage of the 
HSR topology is in duplication of messages within the ring, 
which could cause slowdown of frames due to data clogging in 
Ethernet traffic. 
 
Fig. 6: Node structure of HSR [7]. 
In Fig. 6, a block diagram of HSR topology is shown which 
has a bridging logic between two ports A and B and vice versa. 
The duplication of frames are more pronounced in HSR than 
PRP. The disadvantage of HSR is duplicate detection of frames 
  
 
that could cause flooding in the ring structure. It is observed 
that in the bridging logic, clock synchronization of PRP and 
HSR relies on IEEE 1588 V2.  
III.  NETWORK TOPOLOGIES IN A STATION BUS 
CONFIGURATION 
Fig. 7 exhibits a Single Line Diagram (SLD) which shows a 
typical 132/22-kV high voltage zone substation in a single bus 
configuration. Here, we have investigated the performance of a 
protection system based on PRP and HSR topology using 
OPNET simulator in a station bus configuration, having 
Ethernet ports on IEDs. In RSTP IEDs Red boxes are used 
transform it to PRP and HSR configuration.  
 
Fig. 7. The SLD of a 132/22-kV zone substation. 
 
A) Protection Scheme in a PRP Topology 
The IEDs in the block diagram shown in Fig. 4 are connected 
to switches in duplicated rings interlinked in a meshed 
structure. In this scheme, every IED has 2 layers of links 
providing seamless N-1 redundancy.  
 
 Fig. 8: PRP connection diagram. 
B) Protection Scheme in a HSR Topology 
In HSR topology, the nodes of the IEDs are either connected in 
DANP or SAN scheme via a Red box as shown in Fig. 9 in a 
ring structure. When two frames are sent out in opposite 
directions within the loop, the frame having error is blocked 
while the other reaches travelling on a healthier loop at its 
destination node, preventing loss of frames. The transmittal of 
frames in opposite directions, keep the communication channel 
in a high availability mode. Failure and error with frames makes 
the network vulnerable, which is eliminated by bi-directional 
communication. 
 
Fig. 9: HSR LAN in a single ring. 
IV.  SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
A) PRP Simulation 
An OPNET simulator is used to verify the performance of 
overall delay of a PRP network at the nodes of IEDs and 
switches. This simulation involved GOOSE traffic messages 
floating around in the duplicate local area network. Fig. 10 
exhibits the Ethernet delay at the DANP nodes for an overall 
PRP connected protection scheme of a typical 132/22-kV zone 
substation in a utility environment.  
 
Fig. 10: Ethernet delays based on PRP topology. 
Fig. 11 shows the overall Ethernet delay i.e., End-to-End 
delay in the topology which is encountered for all Ethernet 
connected IED devices and peripherals such as switches, media 
converters and Merging Units etc. 
Fig. 11: Average Ethernet delay at nodes in a PRP topology vs 
overall Ethernet End to End delay. 
 
B) HSR Simulation 
Figs. 12 and 13 exhibit delay in Ethernet network at the DANP 
and SAN nodes for an overall HSR ring topology. Here, 
connected IEDs in the ring are HSR compatible devices but few 
SAN IEDs need Red box to support this topology. The reason 
for inserting Red boxes into the scheme is to prove the 
performance of SAN IEDs in a substation could be modified 
from an old structure to new without making these devices 
  
 
obsolete during protection upgrade from IEC 61850 to IEC 
62439-3. 
  Fig. 12: Ethernet delays based on HSR topology. 
 
 
Fig. 13: Average Ethernet delays in a HSR topology node vs 
the overall delay. 
 
The OPNET simulation for PRP and HSR topologies for 
performance evaluation were carried out with the following 
parameters as listed in Table-II. 
 
Table-II: OPNET simulation for PRP and HSR topologies. 
 PRP HSR 
Events  11,450,473 1,699,890 
Average Speed (events/sec) 2,553,573 1,699,890 
Time elapsed (sec) 4 2 
Duration of simulation (Hrs) 1 1 
DES Log  6 entries 6 entries 
 
The OPNET simulation results indicate that the traffic delay 
at the nodes were slightly higher for HSR in comparison to PRP 
topology due to slow down of frames in the loop due to 
congestion of traffic routed via several nodes at different 
devices connected in a ring. The other notable conclusion 
inferred with respect to this simulation is, in terms of reliability, 
PRP offered better protection due to cross links and duplication 
of the ring having minimal chance of failure. PRP rings are 
virtually local area networks (LAN) that are resilient to faults, 
due to duplication of rings in the scheme. On the other hand, 
HSR topology having a simple architecture, with multiple IEDs 
in switching end nodes are effective in lesser complex digital 
protection network. The notable features in both these 
topologies i.e., PRP and HSR are, IEC 61850 devices having 
single port could be used in IEC 62439-3 inserting Red boxes 
and connected via fiber optic multiplexing adapters as shown in 
Fig. 5. This offers not only flexibility but could be upgraded to 
newer schemes without suffering from technology 
obsolescence. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Protection schemes in a substation require zero recovery time 
in the event of a fault. In other words, the circuit must provide 
zero recovery time to bounce back into active normal mode 
after suffering a failure. With the advancement of technology, 
it is possible to achieve these objectives using PRP and HSR 
topologies leveraging on IEC 62439-3 standard that offers fail-
independent protection scheme in a digital protection network.  
This paper validates on a software platform the performance 
analysis of two digital network topologies in an Ethernet 
platform i.e. PRP and HSR based on IEC 62439-3 standard. The 
software simulation results were performed on a typical 132/22-
kV station bus architecture, which exhibited higher reliability 
and enhanced performance within a digital communication 
network. It validated the speed of frames arriving at nodes as 
per IEC 62439-3 and encouraged its application for future use 
within the utilities.  
Both topologies promise enhanced fault tolerance strength in 
protection and redundancy. These topologies promise to be the 
future of automation and protection and it is recommended to 
be used in digital protection schemes within the utilities and 
industries. 
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